A common objection to my recent behavior is that my ex-girlfriend has asked me, in writing and on several occasions, to stop. I have read all of these requests carefully, in some cases before she sent them. My position is that a request to stop gathering information is not a reason to make decisions without it.

The Decision Problem

Kayla and I separated fourteen months ago. I face a recurring choice between three actions: reach out, wait, or move on. The right action depends on her state, which I cannot observe directly. She might still have feelings for me, she might be ambivalent, or she might be done.

Decision theory has a precise tool for this situation. The expected value of information is the difference between how well you can decide after observing the world and how well you can decide before:

EVI = E_s[ max_a U(a, s) ] − max_a E_s[ U(a, s) ]

Using my current priors (0.25 still has feelings, 0.35 ambivalent, 0.40 done) and payoffs I have estimated with some care, the best I can do without information is to wait, for an expected utility of 2.1. With perfect information about her state, I would reach out when she still has feelings, wait when she's ambivalent, and move on when she's done, for an expected utility of 6.8. The value of knowing is therefore 4.7 utils per decision cycle. I face a new decision cycle roughly every day.

Anyone who tells me to stop monitoring is asking me to give up 4.7 utils a day on the grounds that gathering the information makes them uncomfortable. I have not heard a principled reason to accept that trade.

Data Collection

Direct observation. Her apartment is on the ground floor and faces a strip of hydrangeas across the courtyard. Kneeling behind them, I have a clear view into her living room from about 7 PM until she draws the blinds, usually around 10:40. I bring a thermos, a gardening pad for my knees, and a notebook. I have logged 212 evenings. A neighbor called the police in March. I told the officer I was birdwatching, which was partly true: I had logged two cardinals that evening, and I showed him the entries.

Her accounts. We lived together for two years, and she never changed her passwords. I read her email and her messages each night and go through her calendar on Sundays. I consider this less invasive than asking her friends, since it spares them the awkwardness. Her messages are extremely informative.

Her mother. Linda and I have played Words With Friends every day for eleven months. She is warm and talkative, and the in-game chat has become my best channel. I learned about Kayla's Lisbon trip nine days before Kayla posted about it. Linda doesn't know we broke up. The subject has never come up, and I have never lied to her.

Pottery. In October I enrolled in Kayla's Wednesday wheel-throwing class under my middle name, Graham. The next week she switched to Thursdays, and so did I. Her switching was itself informative: it tells me she noticed me, and noticing is not indifference. My mugs have improved considerably.

The dog. Kayla's dog, Biscuit, came from a breeder in Lancaster County. In December I adopted Biscuit's littermate, Rufus. When Biscuit appears in a post limping or with a new haircut, Rufus lets me separate breed-typical events from events specific to her household. This is the most rigorous thing I have ever done.

Her Distress

Kayla has said she feels unsafe. I take that seriously as a report of her internal state. But feeling unsafe is not a probability of harm, and I have never harmed her. Her fear is evidence about her model of me. When a model is miscalibrated, the remedy is more information, which is exactly what she has been refusing to exchange.

This is also where Aumann's agreement theorem applies. Two rational agents with common priors cannot agree to disagree. Kayla and I disagree about whether the relationship is over. Either our priors differ or one of us is not updating properly. I have offered to exchange information and she has declined, so gathering it myself is the only option she has left me.

The Protective Order

In June a judge granted Kayla a protective order requiring me to stay 500 feet from her, her home and her workplace. Several commenters have told me to update on this, and I have.

A protective order is expensive to obtain. It takes paperwork, a hearing and time off work. In signaling theory, costly signals carry far more information than cheap talk, and this is the costliest signal Kayla has ever sent me. Someone who was indifferent to me would not spend a day in court. I have raised my estimate that she still has feelings from 0.25 to 0.33.

I am complying fully. I have bought a laser rangefinder to make sure of it. My sources are reduced, but Linda knows nothing about the order and has, if anything, become more talkative. The value of information has never been higher.